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Abstract 
The regulatory provisions in India ensure that IPO investors are able to observe the participation 
levels of other subscribers prior to their own subscription decisions. This should reduce the 
information asymmetry between the foreign institutional (FIIs) and domestic institutional 
investors (DIIs). We argue that because of this setting we should observe less difference in their 
investment patterns and performance. Our results, however, show that (a) FIIs subscribe to IPOs 
more aggressively than DIIs; (b) DIIs have better IPO selection ability than FIIs; and (c) in the 
post-listing period, FIIs reduce their IPO holdings more extensively than DIIs. FIIs reduce their 
post-listing holdings especially in firms that are smaller, younger, have higher stock volatility 
while increasing on stocks with higher returns, indicating that FIIs chase hot markets. Overall, in 
spite of transparency-enhancing regulations, the investment patterns of FIIs and DIIs differ 
significantly. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed growing foreign portfolio investments into emerging equity 
markets, potentially driven by reduced restrictions in capital mobility and improved information 
flow. Yet, only a few dimensions of foreign portfolio investments have been examined. One 
particular strand of literature investigates the investment preferences and performances of 
foreign institutional investors relative to domestic investors. For example, Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) show that while domestic institutional investors (DIIs henceforth) and foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs henceforth) share some common investment preferences, they also 
exhibit substantial differences. Some studies also document that FIIs exhibit superior 
performance relative to DIIs on account of their investment experience and expertise (see 
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Seasholes, 2000). On the other hand, Kang and Stulz (1997) and 
Choe et al. (2005) suggest that DIIs perform far better than FIIs, especially because of their 
informational advantage in the home markets. These findings are, however, based on the analysis 
of investments in secondary equity markets. No study, to our knowledge, has compared the 
investment patterns of DIIs and FIIs at the time of initial public offerings (IPOs). This distinction 
is important because investors are likely to have access to more information in secondary 
markets (particularly due to mandatory disclosure requirements, analysts’ coverage, and the 
wider investor-base of listed firms) than in IPO markets. This paper aims to fill the void in the 
literature by comparing the investment patterns of FIIs and DIIs in IPO markets.  
Given the paucity of publicly available information on IPO firms, DIIs are likely to be 
better informed investors than FIIs, since they have the advantage of local knowledge and 
familiarity with domestic firms. This suggests that FIIs face higher investment risks and 
therefore should participate in fewer IPOs. They are also exposed to a higher adverse selection 
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risk, potentially leading to a lower average return as they have to depend on limited information 
to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ IPOs. However, such differences between FIIs and DIIs 
should be significantly less in the context of the Indian IPO market. From the investors’ 
perspective, the Indian IPO market is much more transparent than other markets, since the 
regulations require the stock exchanges to disclose subscription levels of other investors on a 
daily basis during the IPO subscription period.
2
 FIIs should, therefore, be as informed as DIIs, 
through extracting information from the real-time participation activities of DIIs, and be able to 
participate as actively as DIIs in IPO subscriptions. Consequently, there should be no significant 
differences in the ability of FIIs and DIIs to distinguish between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ IPOs in 
the Indian IPO market. 
There are several features of the Indian IPO market that are both unique and relevant for a 
comparative analysis of the participation of FIIs and DIIs. Indian IPO firms are required to 
allocate quota for three investor categories: institutional (50%), non-institutional (15%) and retail 
investors (35%).
3
  The IPO process is very transparent, since the information on the subscription 
of various investor categories is publicly available at the time of the offering. Such information is 
published daily by stock exchanges until the closing date of subscription. This suggests that 
investors wishing to participate in the offer can find out the demand pattern of other investors 
                                                     
2
 The Indian IPO market has become even more transparent in recent years, as the firms which are going 
public are required to acquire and disclose their quality ratings. Similarly, trading activities in grey 
markets provide an opportunity to gather the market value of the IPOs before the closing date for 
subscription. See Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) for further discussion on the transparency of Indian 
IPO markets. 
3
 Large investors such as commercial banks, mutual funds, venture capital funds, and insurance 
companies who are registered with the SEBI are considered to be institutional investors. Retail investors 
are those who can bid up to a value of INR 100,000 in the offering. All other investors are considered to 
be non-institutional investors.  
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before making their own decisions.
4
 The IPO pricing and allocation mechanism in India 
resembles a uniform auction price similar to the ‘Open IPO’ used by WR Hambrecht in the US.5 
This process allows the underwriters to set the offer price within the advertised price range. 
Underwriters do not have any discretion in share allocation and subscribers receive their 
allocation on a pro rata basis. Further, underwriters neither undertake any market stabilization 
activities nor impose penalty bids both of which are fairly common in the US (see Aggarwal, 
2003).  
The key foundation of this paper rests on the fact that, owing to the transparent IPO 
process, both FIIs and DIIs should be able to observe the demand of various investor categories 
before submitting their own subscriptions. Both types of investors should be able to extract 
information from other investors’ activities. Given the transparent nature of the process, we 
should not expect any significant difference in the investment patterns (e.g. participation in IPOs, 
rate of returns, and post-IPO holdings) of FIIs and DIIs. To test this prediction, we address three 
empirical issues, using a sample of IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and/or 
National Stock Exchange (NSE). First, the determinants of DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscriptions at the 
time of the IPO are examined by drawing economic reasoning from literature on both IPOs and 
institutional holdings. Second, we examine the impact of the quality of IPOs, measured by the 
initial as well as the immediate post-listing returns, on the participation of DIIs and FIIs. Finally, 
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 Appendix B-1 (which we also use to demonstrate how we calculate the institutional subscription 
variable) shows this information for one of the sample companies.  
5
 Prior to 2006, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) allowed the use of a modified form of 
book building mechanism in which allocation in the institutional investor category was discretionary. 
Thus, some of our sample firms were issued under this regime. Moreover, firms wishing to go public are 
also allowed to use fixed pricing if they do not meet the requirements for the book building/auction 
mechanism. However, since we are unable to track the participation of institutional investors in these 
IPOs, we exclude them from our analysis.   
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we examine the flipping patterns of DIIs and FIIs, by analyzing their holdings in the immediate 
post-listing period. This analysis shows us how DIIs and FIIs adjust their holdings in the post-
IPO period.  
Our analysis reveals three key findings. First, at the time of the offering, FIIs subscribe 
more heavily than DIIs. FIIs’ subscription is, on average, almost 30% higher than that of DIIs’ 
(3.12 times vs. 2.40 times the number of shares offered). FIIs also seem to subscribe to the IPOs 
that are avoided altogether by DIIs. Analysis of the determinants of IPO subscription shows that 
both DIIs and FIIs prefer firms that are larger, less closely held by insiders, have large cash 
holdings and appear to be positively influenced by recent market returns. On the other hand, 
market volatility at the time of the offer appears to dissuade only DIIs, and not FIIs, from 
investing in Indian IPOs.   
Second, both DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscriptions have a positive relation to the quality of IPOs, 
measured by initial and immediate post-listing returns. However, when both DIIs’ and FIIs’ 
subscriptions are included in the same equation, the influence of the former’s subscriptions 
subsumes that of the latter. DIIs’ subscription appears to be far more measured and informed 
than that of FIIs. This implies that in spite of the transparency of the IPO process, DIIs seem to 
have superior information to FIIs, possibly reflecting the value of local knowledge. 
Finally, we find that institutional investors in general reduce their holdings in IPOs in the 
immediate post-listing period.
6
 This reduction is more prominent in cold (negative initial return) 
than in hot (positive initial return) IPOs. FIIs reduce their holdings significantly more than DIIs. 
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 Since Indian firms are required to submit their shareholding structure on a quarterly basis, we examine 
domestic and foreign institutional holdings at the end of the first four quarters after the date of listing. 
Since institutional holdings remain steady beyond the first quarter, we focus primarily on holdings at the 
end of the first quarter after listing. Section 3.2 discusses quarterly holdings data.  
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Further, DIIs reduce their holdings considerably more in hot IPOs, while FIIs appear to do the 
same in cold IPOs. In the post-listing period, FIIs adjust their position by gravitating towards 
mature and better cashed up as well as those with better stock returns and lower volatility. Since 
FIIs reduce their holdings in cold IPOs and increase their holdings in stocks with better stock 
returns, the evidence is consistent of them being momentum and return chasing investors, as 
noted in Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000).  
This study makes three major contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first study to investigate the investment patterns of DIIs and FIIs in the 
context of IPOs. As such, this work extends the literature on investment behavior of DIIs and 
FIIs (Ferreira and Matos, 2008 and Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000) and reveals that although they 
have several common preferences, their IPO investment strategies differ. Second, this study also 
adds to the investment behavior literature of DIIs and FIIs in an informationally transparent 
context where the concern of information asymmetry is lower than in other IPO markets (Kang 
and Stulz, 1997 and Choe et al., 2005). Even in a relatively transparent Indian IPO market, where 
FIIs and DIIs have access to similar information, their trading patterns and priorities are 
different. FIIs exhibit momentum and return chasing behavior, while DIIs appear to follow 
contrarian trading strategies. Finally, our study shows that although regulators can influence the 
level of transparency of the IPO process, the value of other externalities (e.g. the local 
knowledge possessed by DIIs and the enhanced access to superior expertise and extensive 
experience of FIIs) still influence the investment patterns and security selection abilities of 
institutional investors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related 
literature and develops our testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and presents the 
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descriptive statistics. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical evidence. Section 7 concludes the 
paper.  
2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Related literature 
Existing studies on domestic and foreign investors’ stock ownership can be primarily 
grouped into two broad categories: (i) a comparative analysis of investment performance of 
domestic and foreign investors, and (ii) an analysis of the determinants of institutional 
ownership. Studies in the first category analyze whether domestic investors are better informed 
and earn higher returns than foreign investors. Brennan and Cao (1997), for instance, find that 
US investors tend to purchase foreign equities when foreign market returns are high. Similarly, 
Brennan et al. (2005) show that global financial institutions are more optimistic if the foreign 
market return increases, and vice versa. These findings support the presumption that foreign 
investors are less informed, since they react to lagged information.  
 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Seasholes (2000), on the other hand, argue that FIIs 
should perform better than DIIs because of access to superior expertise and talent. By examining 
investors’ tendency to buy future winning and sell future losing stocks, Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2000) show evidence of foreign investors outperforming local investors. They report that 
domestic investors, presumably less sophisticated, take the opposite position to that of more 
sophisticated foreign investors. Seasholes (2000) also finds that foreign investors react more 
appropriately by buying (selling) before a positive (negative) earning surprise and consequently 
earn above market returns. On the other hand, Choe et al. (2005) and Hau (2001) document that 
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individual domestic investors have an informational advantage over foreign investors. Choe et al. 
(2005) find that foreign investors buy at higher and sell at lower intraday prices than domestic 
investors. Hau (2001) reports that foreign traders earn significantly lower profits than domestic 
ones. Likewise, Dvořák (2005) shows that domestic investors do better than foreign investors, as 
they earn higher profits compared to foreign investors.  
The second strand of literature (i.e. the determinants of institutional ownership) shows the 
differing preferences of foreign and domestic investors. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) show 
that foreign investors prefer the firms that pay lower dividends, are larger in size, and are holding 
larger cash balances. Lin and Shiu (2003) find that foreign investors favor larger firms and low 
book-to-market stocks. Both Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Lin and Shiu (2003) also find 
that foreign investors, possibly due to their different tax status, hold slightly more stocks with 
low dividend yield. Ko et al. (2007) also find that foreign investors have a clearer preference for 
stocks with large capitalization and low book-to-market ratios than do DIIs in both the Japanese 
and Korean stock markets. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that foreign institutional investors 
favor value stocks. Badrinath et al. (1996) and Falkenstein (1996) show that institutional 
investors prefer stocks that have higher market liquidity and lower return volatility. More recent 
studies also show that investors have a preference for firms with better governance structure. 
Doidge et al. (2009) and Leuz et al. (2010) for US institutions, and Ferreira and Matos (2008) for 
global institutions, find a negative relation between large block ownership by insiders and 
institutional holdings. Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show that institutional investors avoid 
companies that have high control to cash flow rights of principal shareholders. Both Bushee et al. 
(2014) and Chung and Zhang (2011) also robustly document a positive relation between 
institutional holdings and the quality of governance structure. 
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In summary, several existing studies compare the investment patterns of foreign and 
domestic investors and explore the determinants of institutional ownership in public firms, 
especially in the context of secondary markets. This study analyses these two issues in the 
context of IPOs.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
The above summary of the literature shows that there is no unanimous evidence on which 
of the two types of investors (foreign or domestic) is better informed, and neither do the studies 
agree on the factors that influence the investment decisions of domestic and foreign investors. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) attribute the superior performance of foreign investors to their 
investment experience and expertise. On the other hand, Kang and Stulz (1997) and Choe et al. 
(2005) suggest that the better performance of domestic investors is due to their informational 
advantage over foreign investors.  
Relative to DIIs, FIIs are likely to face an informational disadvantage in most markets. 
However, in India FIIs should be able to find and use the information available on the 
participation of other investors, particularly DIIs, prior to making their own subscription 
decision.
7
 In spite of such reduced information asymmetry, however, DIIs may still have superior 
information due to their local knowledge. On the other hand, FIIs possess wider investment 
experience and superior expertise, which should enable them to identify and invest in ‘good’ 
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 Since 2007 Indian IPO regulators have also required issuers to grade the offering, using independent 
credit rating agencies. The availability of ratings should further reduce the information asymmetry for 
IPO investors. We re-ran all our analyses using a smaller sample of IPOs that have IPO grading. Our 
results remain qualitatively similar.  
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quality IPOs. Therefore, on balance, there ought to be no substantial information asymmetry 
between the FIIs and DIIs and we hypothesize that ‘there should be no significant difference in 
the investment patterns and performance of DIIs and FIIs in India.’ To test this hypothesis we 
analyze three empirical issues. First, we provide a comparative analysis of the level of 
subscriptions of FIIs and DIIs. Second, we examine and identify the determinants of initial 
returns of both FIIs and DIIs. Third, post-listing holdings of FIIs and DIIs are analyzed to assess 
their flipping behavior.  
To examine whether DIIs or FIIs subscribe to more IPOs, we analyze their subscriptions at 
the time of the issue and their holdings immediately after the listing. If both groups of investors 
(FIIs and DIIs) have the same level of information their subscription rates should not differ 
significantly. An analysis of the holdings of FIIs and DIIs in the post-listing period will also 
enable us to assess whether FIIs are return chasers. We examine the determinants of the initial 
returns of the IPO firms to test whether DIIs or FIIs are superior in IPO selection. Analysis of 
these three research issues, collectively, should help address our main research issue of whether 
there is any information asymmetry between the FIIs and DIIs to test the prediction that ‘there 
should be no significant difference in the investment patterns and performance of DIIs and FIIs 
in India.’ 
3. Data and summary statistics 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.1 Data 
The sample is comprised of 329 IPOs listed on the BSE and/or NSE of India between 
January 2004 and December 2013. Table 1 shows how we arrived at the sample of IPOs for the 
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study. The total number of IPOs issued during the sample period is 461, of which 110 are fixed 
price offerings. As stated earlier (footnote 5), since we are unable to track the participation of 
institutional investors in fixed-price offerings, we exclude them from our analysis. In line with 
prior IPO literature and also because they are substantially larger than the average IPO, we 
exclude 19 privatization, financial and utilities IPOs. We also exclude 3 IPOs because of missing 
data. The data on firm and IPO characteristics are extracted from the IPO prospectus. The market 
data as well as the data on the subscriptions of DIIs and FIIs are collected from the BSE website 
(www.bseindia.com). For IPOs with missing institutional subscription data on the BSE, we 
collect institutional allocation data from an IPO portal (Chittorgarh; www.chittorgarh.com)
8
 to 
construct the institutional subscription variable.  
Appendices B-1 and B-2 show how we use data from the above mentioned websites to 
construct DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscriptions. Appendix B-1 shows institutional subscription data 
available on the BSE website. Panel A shows the information available on the website and Panel 
B shows how we construct the variables of interest. We construct domestic and foreign 
subscriptions by dividing their respective subscriptions by the total shares reserved for the 
institutional investor category. For IPOs with information missing on the BSE website, we 
construct the institutional subscription variable by using institutional allocation and the overall 
institutional subscription data. Since allocation is on a pro rata basis for the majority of our 
sample firms, we use allocation and the overall times subscribed to construct the institutional 
subscription. Panel A of Appendix B-2 shows the allocation for one of our sample firms and 
Panel B shows how we construct our variable of interest. As above, we again construct domestic 
and foreign subscriptions by dividing their respective subscriptions by the total shares reserved 
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 Chittorgarh is considered to be India’s primary IPO investment portal.  
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for the institutional investor category. Indian firms are required to submit their shareholding 
pattern to the SEBI on a quarterly basis, showing the holdings of different investor categories, 
including DIIs and FIIs. This information is publicly available on the BSE website. Data on total 
institutional holdings, as well as for DIIs and FIIs, is taken from the Capitaline database
9
  and we 
verify its accuracy by randomly cross-checking some data with those available on the BSE 
website.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of firms and offers, market-related and institutional 
subscription variables of our sample of 329 IPOs. Appendix A provides definitions of all the 
variables used in the study. Panel A reports summary statistics related to investor subscription at 
the time of the IPO. The average (median) total subscription is 18.81 (5.78) times whereas the 
average (median) total institutional subscription is 21.84 (6.22) times, which shows that IPOs in 
India are well subscribed by investors. The mean (median) subscription by DIIs and FIIs is 9.15 
(2.40) and 12.45 (3.12) times respectively. Both mean and median differences are statistically 
significant at the less than 1% significance level.
10
 This suggests that FIIs’ subscription is much 
higher than DIIs’ at the time of the offering. To better understand this participation of DIIs and 
FIIs, in Panel D we report the statistics on IPOs that are subscribed vs. those that are not 
subscribed by institutional investors. As shown, DIIs completely avoid 54 of the 329 IPOs 
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 www.capitaline.com 
10
 We run the paired t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test to test the difference between domestic 
and foreign institutional subscriptions respectively.  
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(16.41%), a figure which is twice as high as the 27 IPOs (8.20%) completely avoided by FIIs. 
Further, FIIs avoid only 11 of the 54 IPOs avoided by DIIs. Thus, it appears that FIIs do not free-
ride on the publicly available information on DIIs subscription.  Moreover, in spite of being 
exposed to the same level of officially disclosed information, the investment patterns of FIIs and 
DIIs differ significantly, with FIIs possibly relying more on their access to superior analytical 
skills and wider experience, while DIIs depend on their local knowledge.  
Panels B and C of Table 2 report summary statistics related to firm, offer and market-
related variables. Overall, the average (median) size of the firms measured by their total assets is 
INR 7,361 (1,895) and the average (median) market capitalization based on the offer price is 
INR 22,576 (3,926) million.
11
 Similarly, the average (median) age and debt of the sample are 
14.33 (12) years and 56% (61%) respectively.  Promoters’ (founders’) ownership pre-IPO and 
post-IPO averages about 56% and 23% respectively. The average (median) return on assets 
(ROA) (for the full year prior to IPO) is 9% (7%) and the average (median) percentage of cash 
and marketable securities to total assets is 32% (1%).  Likewise, the average (median) book-to-
market value is around 0.55 (0.41). The average (median) underwriter reputation, which equals 1 
for reputable underwriters, is 0.58 (1) which shows the majority of the IPOs during the sample 
period are managed by reputable underwriters. The average (median) market-adjusted first day 
return for our sample of firms is 19% (9%). 
4. Determinants of Institutional Subscription 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the determinants of IPO subscription for 
DIIs and FIIs, using an OLS regression framework as shown in Equation (1) below. The main 
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 US$ 1 was approximately equal to INR 45 (on average) during our sample period. 
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dependent variable is institutional investors’ subscription. We define institutional subscription as 
the ratio of the shares bid to the shares reserved for the institutional investor category. Appendix 
A provides definitions of all the variables used in the study. As is the norm in the IPO literature 
(see Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Neupane and Poshakwale, 2012) and to smooth out the 
excessive effect of the variable, we use the logarithm of one plus the institutional investors’ 
subscription in our specifications.  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠′𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
′𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽9𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽10𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 
11
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
12
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀 
(1) 
The inclusion of firm, IPO and market specific variables in Equation (1) are motivated by 
the economic explanations and empirical evidence documented in existing studies. The literature 
suggests that institutional investors are attracted to larger (log of market capitalization), more 
mature (log of age) and growth (low book-to-market ratios) firms (see Gompers and Metrick, 
2001; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Chung and Zhang, 2011). Similarly, studies also suggest that 
institutional holdings are positively related to firms’ returns (ROA), cash holdings and 
investment opportunities, while they are negatively related to higher leverage and insiders’ 
holdings (i.e. promoters’ post-IPO holdings) (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Chung and Zhang, 
2011).  It has also been noted that institutional holdings are influenced by stock return and 
15 
 
volatility. We account for such conjecture by including the overall market return and market 
volatility at the time of the IPO. As Field and Lowry (2009) report a positive relation between 
institutional holdings and the reputation of the underwriter, we also include underwriters’ 
reputation as one of the explanatory variables. The models also control for year and industry 
fixed effects.
12
  
We present the results of three different specifications of Equation (1) in Table 3.  The 
dependent variable of specification (1) is the logarithm of one plus the overall institutional 
investors’ subscription. In specification (2) the dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus 
DIIs’ subscription. Finally, in specification (3) the dependent variable is the logarithm of one 
plus FIIs’ subscription.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The estimates in specification 1 (Table 3) show that the total institutional subscription is 
positively related to the market capitalization of the firm and cash holdings. This suggests that 
larger and more profitable firms with higher liquid assets receive higher institutional interest 
than smaller and less profitable firms with fewer liquid assets. This is consistent with the 
findings reported in Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) for the US market, and 
in Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) for the Swedish market. Further, total institutional 
subscription is also positively related to underwriter’s reputation and recent market return. This 
implies that institutional participation is significantly higher in IPOs managed by underwriters 
with a high reputation and is also likely to be higher in periods following high recent market 
returns. On the other hand, institutional participation is negatively related to promoters’ post-IPO 
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 We control for industry effects by classifying firms in 11 different industry categories.  
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holdings, which indicates that institutional investors subscribe less in firms with large-block 
ownerships by insiders (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Higher holdings are associated with 
concentrated control rights, and there is considerable evidence that institutions invest less in 
firms with large-block ownership by insiders (i.e. promoters) (Doidge et al., 2009; Leuz et al., 
2010). We also find a negative relation between institutional subscription and recent market 
volatility. The negative coefficient suggests that institutional investors become less inclined to 
participate in IPOs at times of high market volatility. The coefficients of firm age, book-to-
market ratio, ROA, leverage and investment opportunities are not significant.    
 
Next, we separately examine the subscriptions of DIIs and FIIs, and report the results in 
specifications (2) and (3) respectively. Although most of the control variables appear to have a 
similar influence, we also find that while the coefficient of market volatility is significant for 
DIIs, it is not significant in the case of FIIs. In terms of economic significance, we find that 
when recent market volatility increases with an amount equal to 10% of its median value, the 
participation of DIIs decreases by about 4.5%. The corresponding figure for FIIs is less than 1%.   
Further, whilst we find similar statistical significance in the control variables on the 
participation of DIIs and FIIs, our analysis shows that the level of economic significance varies. 
For instance, the market capitalization of the IPO firm, cash holdings and recent market return 
have greater influence on the subscription of FIIs than of DIIs. On the other hand, ROA and 
underwriter’s reputation appears to have a greater influence on DIIs’ subscription. Overall, our 
results show that while there are similarities in the subscriptions by DIIs and FIIs in relation to 
market capitalization, cash holdings and promoters’ post-IPO holdings, there are also some 
differences, most notably in relation to market volatility at the time of the offering.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
5. Institutional subscription and IPO returns 
This section examines the influence of DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscriptions on initial listing 
returns. Prior studies (Field and Lowry, 2009; Chiang et al., 2010) have shown that institutional 
investors are better informed and hence their participation is positively related to IPO listing 
performance. We contribute to the literature by examining the impact of subscription by DIIs 
and FIIs, first separately and then jointly, on their listing period returns.  
We estimate six different specifications of equation (2) and the results are presented in 
Table 4. The dependent variable in specifications (1) to (4) is the first day market-adjusted 
return. The dependent variables in specifications (5) and (6) are the market-adjusted returns of 
the first week and the first month respectively. The market-adjusted return is the difference 
between raw IPO returns and the corresponding market returns. We use the BSE Sensex index to 
estimate market returns. 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 
11
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
12
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀 
(2) 
In Equation (2), our main explanatory variables of interest are alternative measures of 
institutional subscription. In specifications (1) – (3) the variables of interest are overall 
institutional subscription (logarithm of one plus overall institutional subscription), DIIs’ 
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subscription (logarithm of one plus DIIs’ subscription) and FIIs’ subscription (logarithm of one 
plus FIIs’ subscription) respectively. Specifications (4) – (6) include both DIIs’ and FIIs’ 
subscriptions. We also control for a number of factors that have been identified in prior studies 
(Field and Lowry, 2009; Chiang et al., 2010). They include: log of market capitalization, log of 
one plus the age of the firm, a dummy variable for the reputation of the underwriter managing 
the IPO. Following Derrien and Womack (2003), we also include market return and market 
volatility at the time of IPO.
 13
 The regressions also control for year and industry fixed effects. 
Appendix A provides definitions of all the variables used in the study. 
As noted earlier, in specifications (1) - (3) we separately examine the influence of overall 
institutional, domestic and foreign subscription respectively on first day market-adjusted returns. 
The results show a strong relation between first day return and all the three institutional 
subscription variables. Consistent with previous studies we also find that the initial return is 
negatively related to both market capitalization and underwriter reputation. Since the impact of 
recent market return and market volatility is already incorporated in institutional subscription, 
the coefficients of neither market return nor market volatility are statistically significant.  
Specification (4) includes both DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscription. The estimates show that while 
the coefficient on DIIs’ subscription remains positive and significant, the coefficient on FIIs’ 
subscription loses its significance. The sign as well as the statistical significance of most of the 
other variables remains the same. This result suggests that DIIs’ subscription is more influential 
and subsumes the impact of FIIs’ subscription in explaining first day market returns. Given the 
evidence on subscription that we show in the previous section, this evidence is not entirely 
surprising, since DIIs’ subscription appears to be more measured as well as more varied 
                                                     
13
 For detailed descriptions of the economic arguments for their inclusion, refer to the studies mentioned. 
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compared to that of FIIs. Importantly, when taken together the evidence on subscription and 
initial returns suggests that by not considering the publicly available information on DIIs’ 
subscription, FIIs’ investment appears to be plagued by informational disadvantage.     
Further diagnostic tests are carried out to examine whether specification (4) is plagued by 
collinearity. We calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for variables included in specification 
(4). The VIFs for DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscription variables are 3.38 and 3.65 respectively. Since 
these figures are below the threshold of 5 that is commonly used in the literature (Hogan et al., 
2001), we argue that standard interpretations of the regression coefficients can be made for 
results presented in specification (4).     
In specifications (5) and (6), we re-run specification (4) by replacing the dependent 
variable with first week and first month market-adjusted returns respectively. The unreported 
results show that separately the coefficients of both DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscriptions are positive and 
statistically significant. However, as with first day returns, only DIIs’ subscription remains 
statistically significant when both DIIs’ and FIIs’ subscriptions are included in the same 
specification. VIF for specifications (5) and (6) for domestic and foreign institutional 
subscription variables are similar to those reported in specification (4).  
Overall, the results discussed above demonstrate that the subscription of institutional 
investors is positively related to post-listing returns, demonstrating their stock picking abilities. 
Importantly, however, our findings suggest that in the context of Indian IPOs, the degree of 
participation by DIIs, which appears to be measured and varied, has a greater influence on post-
listing returns than the participation of FIIs.  
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6. Post-IPO holdings of Institutional Investors 
This section examines institutional investors’ holdings in the immediate post-listing period. 
We extend the analysis of DIIs and FIIs beyond the IPO subscription stage for two reasons. First, 
prior studies (Aggarwal, 2003; Ellis, 2006) suggest that investors flip a significant portion of 
their allocation in the immediate post-listing period. Thus, a subscription at the time of the IPO 
may only reflect an interest on the part of the investor in making a quick return rather than 
investing on the basis of sound company fundamentals. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Bohn 
and Tesar (1996) suggest that FIIs represent hot money chasing hot markets. Second, 
institutional investors subscribing to Indian IPOs are only required to deposit 10% of the bid 
amount at the time of subscription. Hence, institutional investors may oversubscribe, relative to 
their investable funds, at the time of the IPO in order to improve their allocations.  Thus, given 
these two aspects of IPO subscription, we further examine institutional holdings through 
univariate and multivariate analysis for two calendar quarters after the date of listing. 
6.1 Univariate Analysis  
Table 5 reports univariate statistics on institutional investors’ holdings at the time of 
allocation (column 1), at the end of the first quarter (column 2) and at the end of the second 
quarter (column 3). The figures show the mean (median) percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors relative to the total outstanding shares. Such holdings are reported first for 
overall institutional investors and then separately for DIIs and FIIs. Panel A reports institutional 
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holdings for the total sample of IPOs and Panel B reports institutional holdings by first day 
return quartiles.  
As shown in Panel A, the overall median IPO has a total institutional ownership of 13.76% 
at the time of allocation, which declines to 10.21% and 10.25% at the end of the first and second 
quarters respectively. Consistent with evidence from previous studies (Aggarwal, 2003; Ellis, 
2006), evidence in Table 5 indicates that institutional investors reduce their holding in IPO firms 
in the post-listing period. The mean (median) decline of 3.68% (3.55%) from the date of 
allocation to the end of the first quarter is statistically significant.
14
 Since FIIs subscribe more at 
the time of the IPO, their holdings in the median overall IPO at the time of the allocation is 
7.33%, which is 2.40% higher than the DIIs’ holding in the median overall IPO. Interestingly, we 
also find that FIIs reduce their holdings more than DIIs in the post-listing period. Between the 
date of allocation and the end of the first quarter, FIIs reduce their holdings by 2.40% in the 
median overall IPO. DIIs, by comparison, reduce their holdings by only 1.16%. Institutional 
investors’ holdings appear to remain steady in the period beyond the first quarter. The median 
DIIs’ holdings are 3.34% and 3.07% at the end of the first and second quarters respectively. The 
corresponding figures for FIIs are 4.93% and 4.73% respectively. 
In Panel B we report institutional holdings by quartiles of first day returns for four different 
IPO categories: cold IPOs (n=82 and mean first day return = -22.04%); cool IPOs (n=82 and 
mean first day return = -0.002%); warm IPOs (n=83 and mean first day return = 23.43%); and 
hot IPOs (n=82 and mean first day return = 76.20%). The analysis of institutional holdings by 
                                                     
14
 It should be noted that while the sum of mean domestic and foreign institutional holdings will add up to 
total mean institutional holdings, the sum of median domestic and foreign institutional holdings will not 
add up to total median institutional holdings.  
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first day return quartiles presents a number of interesting observations. Overall, we find that 
institutional investors reduce their holdings the most in the weaker (cold and cool) offerings, 
with the median holdings declining in cold IPOs from 14.39% at allocation to 8.99% (a decline 
of 5.50%) at the end of the first quarter. The corresponding decline in cool, warm and hot IPOs 
are 3.34%, 0.76% and 3.67% respectively. This evidence of institutional investors reducing their 
holdings in weaker IPOs is not consistent with the evidence from US IPOs (Aggarwal, 2003).  
We also find significant differences in how FIIs and DIIs reduce their holdings in the post-
listing period. The results suggest that while FIIs reduce their holdings more in weaker offerings, 
DIIs appear to do so in hot offerings. FIIs reduce their holdings from 8.01% at allocation to 
2.85% at the end of the first quarter in the median cold IPO, a decline of 5.16%, with the 
difference statistically significant at the less than 1% significance level. The corresponding 
decline in DIIs’ holdings is only 0.76%. FIIs reduce their holdings by 2.23%, 1.97% and 1.57% 
in cool, warm and hot IPOs respectively. DIIs, on the other hand, reduce their holdings the most 
in the hot IPOs. They only hold 1.56% in the median hot IPO at the end of the first quarter after 
the listing, down from 4.40% at the time of allocation.  
Overall, the univariate analysis suggests that DIIs and FIIs not only exhibit different 
investment strategies at the time of subscription, but also in the post-listing period. This evidence 
is consistent with Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), who show that domestic investors take a 
different position compared to that of FIIs. While our analysis does not divulge which of these 
two investor categories performs better over the long-term, our evidence with respect to 
subscription, post-listing performance and post-listing holdings suggests that FIIs appear to be 
more aggressive and short-term oriented than DIIs.   
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6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
In this sub-section we examine post-IPO institutional holdings in a multiple regression 
framework. Given that institutional investors may oversubscribe at the time of offering, we first 
re-examine the determinants of institutional holdings using shareholding data as at the end of the 
first quarter after listing. Second, since our univariate analysis above shows significant changes 
in institutional holdings from the date of allocation to the end of the first quarter after listing, we 
examine the determinants of such change. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.  
Specifications (1), (2) and (3) in Table 6 replicate the analysis presented in Table 3 by 
replacing institutional oversubscription with institutional holdings at the end of the first quarter 
of listing as the dependent variable. Further, we use all the independent variables as specified in 
Equation (1) other than replacing the market return and market volatility with stock return and 
stock volatility variables. We make a few notable observations on the comparison of the two 
results. While some variables lose their significance, others become stronger in explaining 
institutional holdings. The insignificant coefficient of market capitalization for domestic 
institutional holdings suggests that domestic investors are equally likely to hold stocks in both 
large and small companies, while foreign investors show a strong preference for the larger firms. 
The statistical significance of the coefficient of promoters’ post-IPO holdings (concentrated 
insiders’ holdings) is much stronger with first quarter holdings. Further, both DIIs and FIIs are 
likely to hold shares of firms that are mature and established. The observed change in 
significance of some variables from IPO subscription to first quarter holdings is consistent with 
24 
 
the findings of Ellis (2006), who argues that long-term investors may adjust their position 
following IPO allocation by either flipping or accumulating in the period after the offering.   
In specifications (4), (5) and (6), we re-run the regressions by using the change in 
institutional holdings (from allocation to the end of the first quarter) as the dependent variable. 
This analysis sheds light on the factors that drive institutional investors to adjust their position in 
the period following the allocation of shares. Results show that the five factors that influence 
changes in institutional holdings in the immediate period after the IPO are: age of the firm, cash 
holdings, underwriter reputation, stock return and volatility. While only one of these factors is 
significant in explaining the change in DIIs’ holdings (specification 5), all five factors are 
significant for explaining the change in FIIs’ holdings. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that the 
change in DIIs’ holdings is far less than the change in FIIs’ holdings in the post-listing period. 
The results also show that FIIs reduce their holdings in firms that are younger, less profitable and 
have lower cash holdings. Stock return and volatility also appear to influence the change in 
institutional holdings, as FIIs reduce their holdings in firms with poor post-listing stock returns 
and higher stock volatility. These results are largely consistent with Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
and Chung and Zhang (2011). 
7. Robustness Tests 
In this section we conduct a number of robustness tests to confirm the validity of our results.
15
 
7.1 Using only auction IPOs 
As mentioned earlier (footnote 5), our sample includes both book-building and auction 
IPOs. One of the main changes in IPO regulation when it moved from a book-building to an 
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 The results of all these robustness tests can be made available upon request. 
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auction mechanism was the removal of allocation discretion in the institutional investor category. 
Prior research has shown that underwriters’ discretion in allocation influences how investors 
subscribe to IPO shares (Jenkinson and Jones, 2009). To address the issue that the change in 
regulation (from discretion to pro-rata allocation) may have influenced how investors participate 
in auction relative to book-building IPOs, we re-ran all our analyses (IPO subscription, analysis 
of IPO returns and post-IPO holdings) using only auction IPOs. All of our results remain 
qualitatively similar. 
 
7.2 Alternative time windows for post-IPO holding analysis 
Our post-IPO holding analysis uses data up to the end of the first quarter of listing. For 
robustness purposes we extend this analysis and examine institutional holdings up to the end of 
the first year of listing. We find that institutional holdings remain reasonably stable after the first 
quarter. Mean (median) total, domestic and foreign institutional holdings at the end of the first 
year after listing are 11.05% (10.98%), 4.79% (2.86%) and 6.45% (4.47%) respectively. We re-
ran the post-IPO holdings multivariate analysis using the end of the first year holdings and find 
that all results remain qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 6.     
7.3 Alternative measures of the variables used in the study 
To ensure that our results are robust to how we measure the variables, we re-ran the 
analysis by employing alternative measures of some of the explanatory variables of primary 
interest. Instead of using market capitalization and book-to-market variables based on the offer 
price, we re-ran the analysis using variables calculated on the basis of the stock price at the end 
of the first day of listing and the price at the end of the first month. Results remain qualitatively 
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similar. Additionally, we use only long-term debt in calculating the leverage ratio as an 
alternative specification of the variable. Similarly, when we examine institutional holdings at the 
end of the first year of holdings we use stock return and stock volatility variables based on daily 
returns in the first year of listing. None of these specifications alter the quality of findings 
presented in the earlier section.    
8. Conclusions 
Using a dataset of 329 firms, this study examines the investment behavior of DIIs and FIIs 
in IPOs in the context of the Indian market. The study uncovers a number of interesting findings. 
By examining institutional subscriptions at the time of IPO, we find that FIIs are more aggressive 
and subscribe significantly more to IPOs than do DIIs. The results also show that different 
economic determinants which in the prior literature are associated with institutional investment 
have an asymmetric influence on the subscriptions of both FIIs and DIIs. Since investment by 
DIIs seems more measured and varied than that by FIIs, the study finds that domestic 
institutional subscription is significantly more influential in explaining listing and immediate 
post-listing returns.  
Given that the extant literature suggests that investors flip a significant portion of IPO 
allocation, we also examine the immediate post-listing period holding patterns of DIIs and FIIs.  
The results show that FIIs not only subscribe more at the time of the IPO, but they also appear to 
reduce their holdings more than DIIs in the immediate post-listing period. DIIs and FIIs also 
exhibit differences in the types of firm in which they reduce their holdings, with the former 
reducing holdings considerably more in hot IPOs, while the latter appear to do the same in cold 
IPOs. Overall, in spite of the regulatory provisions that allow all investors to have the same level 
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of information, the investment patterns and stock selection of FIIs and DIIs differ significantly. 
Consequently, our main prediction that ‘there should be no significant difference in the 
investment patterns and performance of DIIs and FIIs in India’ is not supported. Possibly the 
difference in the investment patterns and stock selection of FIIs and DIIs results from their 
differences in experience, access to expert skills and local knowledge.   
A potential limitation of this study is related to wider generalization. Since the study is 
based on the unique setting of the Indian IPO market, the findings may not be helpful to 
investors in less transparent markets. Nevertheless, the findings of this study have important 
implications for uninformed retail investors in India. Neupane and Poshakwale (2012) show that 
retail investors can do well in IPO investment in India by following the participation of 
institutional investors. Our evidence shows that it would be more prudent for retail investors to 
follow the investment of DIIs as they appear to be more measured and informed in their IPO 
subscriptions. Since subscription by different investor categories, including DIIs, is available 
publicly during the offering period, retail investors can use this information to improve on their 
investment performance. Whilst the regulatory provisions are helpful in reducing information 
asymmetry among the various categories of investors, local knowledge seems to remain valuable 
in investment decisions. This implies that although FIIs have access to superior expertise and 
experience they could still benefit by extracting signals from the participation levels of DIIs.  
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Appendix A 
Description of variables used in the study 
Variables Definition 
Institutional subscription/holdings variables 
Total Subscription 
The ratio of total shares bid by all investors to the total number 
of shares offered 
Institutional Subscription 
The ratio of total shares bid by the institutional investors to the 
total number of shares offered to institutional investors 
Domestic Subscription 
The ratio of total shares bid by the DIIs to the total number of 
shares offered to institutional investors 
Foreign Subscription  
The ratio of total shares bid by the FIIs to the total number of 
shares offered to institutional investors 
Total Institutional Holdings 
The percentage of shares held by total institutional investors 
relative to the total shares outstanding 
Domestic Holdings 
The percentage of shares held by DIIs relative to the total shares 
outstanding 
Foreign Holdings 
The percentage of shares held by FIIs relative to the total shares 
outstanding 
Firm and offer variables  
Total Assets  
Book value of total assets at the time of the IPO (logarithm of 
total assets) 
Proceeds 
Gross proceeds of the offer calculated by multiplying the offer 
price by the number of shares offered 
Market Capitalization 
The total market capitalization of the firm based on the offer 
price (logarithm of market capitalization)  
Age  
Difference between a firm’s IPO year and the founding year 
(logarithm of 1 plus the firm’s age) 
Promoters’ Pre-IPO Holdings 
The ratio of the shares held by promoters (founders) to the total 
outstanding shares before the IPO 
Promoters’ Post-IPO Holdings  
The ratio of the shares held by promoters’ (founders) to the total 
outstanding shares after the IPO 
Leverage  The ratio of total debt to total assets at the time of the IPO 
ROA  
The return on total assets for the full year prior to the year of the 
IPO 
Cash  The ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets at the 
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time of the IPO. 
Book-to-Market  
The ratio of the book-to-market value of equity (calculated at 
the offer price) at the time of the IPO offer 
Stock Return  
Annualized return based on the average daily stock returns for 
the first three months of listing, excluding the return on the first 
day of listing 
Stock Volatility  
Standard deviation of the daily returns for the first three months 
of listing, excluding the first day of listing 
Investment Opportunities  
Geometric average growth rate in sales in the three years prior 
to the year of the IPO  
Underwriter Reputation  
The binary variable which equals 1 for reputable underwriters 
and 0 otherwise. We categorize as reputable those underwriters 
who have managed at least INR 10,000 million during the 
sample period (Neupane and Poshakwale, 2012). 
Market-adjusted First Day 
Return  
Difference between raw first day return and market return, 
where the market return is the return on the BSE Sensex index 
over the same period. Raw first day return is the simple return 
calculated between the offer price and the closing price at the 
end of the first day of trading. 
Market Return  
The weighted average of the buy-and-hold returns on the BSE 
Sensex index in the three months prior to the IPO issue opening 
date t; the weights being 3 for the month before the IPO date 
(Mt-1), 2 for the month before that (Mt-2), and 1 for the third 
month before the offering (Mt-3) 
Market Volatility  
The standard deviation of the market returns one month prior to 
the issue opening date 
Cold IPO  
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if IPO first day return is 
below negative and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix B-1 
Ashoka Buildcon (From the BSE Website) 
Panel A: Information available from the website  
# Category No. of shares 
offered/reserved 
No. of shares bid for Times Subscribed 
1 Institutional Investors 3,165,909 80,792,565 25.52 
1(a) FIIs  45,078,915  
1(b) Domestic Financial Institutions 
(Banks/ Financial Institutions 
(FIs)/ Insurance Companies) 
 21,523,173  
1(c) Mutual Funds  14,188,335  
1(d) Others  2,142  
 
Panel B: Construction of Subscription Variable 
Category Domestic Foreign Total  
No. of Shares reserved for Institutional Investors   3,165,909 
No. of Shares bid  35,713,650 45,078,915 80,792,565 
Times Subscribed (Shares bid/Reserved for Institutional Investors) 14.24 11.28 25.52 
 
Appendix B-2 
 Blue Bird India Ltd (From Chittorgarh Website) 
Panel A: Information available from the website 
Allocation to Institutional Investors 
Category Domestic Institutional Investors Foreign Institutional Investors   Total  
No. of Equity Shares 1,765,780 2,621,720 4,387,500 
 
Panel B: Construction of Subscription Variable 
Category Domestic Foreign Total  
No. of Equity Shares Allocated 1,765,780 2,621,720 4,387,500 
No. of Shares Reserved for Institutional Investors   1,512,930 
No. of Times Subscribed by Institutional Investors   2.90 
No. of Shares bid (Allocation × Overall Times Subscribed) 5,120,762 7,602,988  
Times Subscribed (Shares bid/Reserved for Institutional Investors) 1.73 1.17  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Total IPOs issued between January 2004 and December 2013  461 
                                                                     less: fixed price offerings 110 
                                                                     less: privatization, financial and utility IPOs 19 
                                             less : IPOs with missing data  3 
Total IPO firms used in the study 329 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min. Median 
Panel A: Institutional Subscription Variables    
Total subscription 18.81 27.00 0.95 5.78 
Institutional subscription 21.84 34.28 0.00 6.22 
Domestic subscription 9.15 14.24 0.00 2.40 
Foreign subscription 12.45 20.77 0.00 3.12 
Panel B: Firm and Offer Variables     
Total assets (Mill INR) 7,361 17,750 70 1,895 
Proceeds (Mill INR) 3,597 9,356 140 1,131 
Market capitalization (Mill INR) 22,576 84,446 373 3,926 
Age 14.33 10.92 0.00 12.00 
Underwriter reputation 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Promoters’ pre-IPO holdings 0.56 0.22 0.00 0.61 
Promoters’ post-IPO holdings 0.23 0.15 0.00 0.21 
Leverage 0.56 0.22 0.00 0.61 
ROA 0.09 0.14 -0.65 0.07 
Cash 0.32 0.17 0.00 0.01 
Book-to-market 0.55 0.62 0.01 0.41 
Investment opportunities                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    0.45 1.18 -0.96 0.35 
Market return 0.04 0.07 -0.23 0.05 
Market volatility 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Market-adjusted first day return 0.19 0.43 -0.93 0.09 
Panel C: Stock Market Variables     
Stock return annual -0.28 -0.27 -0.74 0.83 
Stock volatility 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.02 
       Panel D: IPOs Subscribed to vs. Avoided 
 Domestic Foreign 
# of IPOs Subscribed to 
275 
83.59% 
302 
91.79% 
# of IPOs Avoided 
54 
16.41% 
27 
8.20% 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of Indian IPO characteristics along with subscription details. The sample 
includes IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE between January 2004 and December 2013. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A. There are only 11 IPOs in which both DIIs and FIIs have avoided subscription.  
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Table 3 
Determinants of foreign and domestic institutional investors’ subscription at the IPO 
 
 
Total 
(1) 
Domestic 
(2) 
Foreign 
(3) 
 
Log Market Capitalization 0.311*** 0.206*** 0.307***  
 (4.32) (3.12) (4.82)  
     
Book-to-Market 0.043 0.055 0.014  
 (0.40) (0.57) (0.13)  
     
Log Age 0.119 0.152 0.069  
 (1.04) (1.51) (0.66)  
     
ROA 0.628 0.721 0.620  
 (1.35) (1.32) (1.37)  
     
Cash 0.744*** 0.681*** 0.691***  
 (4.62) (2.83) (5.82)  
     
Leverage -0.319 -0.300 -0.157  
 (-0.80) (-0.84) (-0.43)  
     
Investment Opportunities 0.020 0.036 0.010  
 (0.56) (1.02) (0.26)  
     
Promoter’s Post-IPO holdings  -0.943** -0.829* -0.761*  
 (-1.98) (-1.90) (-1.78)  
     
Underwriter Reputation 0.528*** 0.591*** 0.371**  
 (2.64) (3.18) (2.09)  
     
Market Return  4.497*** 3.907*** 4.301***  
 (3.94) (3.67) (4.17)  
     
Market Volatility -15.308* -20.348** -3.079  
 (-1.77) (-2.42) (-0.22)  
     
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  
     
Constant -1.029 -0.576 -1.939***  
 (-1.40) (-0.81) (-2.89)  
Observations 329 329 329  
Adjusted R
2
 0.473 0.417 0.457  
 
This table shows the OLS regression results for the determinants of the subscription of total institutional investors, 
FIIs, and DIIs. The sample includes IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE from January 2004 to December 2013. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix A. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 4  
Institutional Subscription and IPO returns 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Institutional subscription 0.200***      
 (9.51)      
       
Log Domestic subscription  0.218***  0.189*** 0.241*** 0.291*** 
  (8.96)  (3.38) (3.86) (4.10) 
       
Log Foreign subscription   0.188*** 0.034 0.003 -0.016 
   (8.02) (0.67) (0.05) (-0.28) 
       
Log Market Capitalization -0.054*** -0.043** -0.052*** -0.046** -0.029 -0.017 
 (-2.82) (-2.24) (-2.60) (-2.32) (-1.28) (-0.63) 
       
Log Age -0.027 -0.037 -0.016 -0.034 -0.030 -0.055 
 (-0.81) (-1.11) (-0.47) (-1.02) (-0.79) (-1.23) 
       
Underwriter Reputation -0.208*** -0.219*** -0.169*** -0.218*** -0.255*** -0.252*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.88) (-2.86) (-3.88) (-3.71) (-2.71) 
       
Market Return 0.251 0.264 0.353 0.240 0.319 0.179 
 (0.55) (0.59) (0.74) (0.53) (0.67) (0.36) 
       
Market Volatility 8.128 9.477 5.926 8.990 4.932 -1.046 
 (1.51) (1.53) (1.06) (1.58) (0.89) (-0.18) 
       
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
       
Constant 0.587*** 0.589*** 0.714*** 0.613*** 0.509** 0.508* 
 (2.66) (2.65) (3.06) (2.73) (2.23) (1.74) 
Observations 329 329 329 329 329 329 
Adjusted R
2
 0.292 0.288 0.232 0.287 0.287 0.298 
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This table shows the OLS regression results for determinants of the IPO return. In specifications (1) – (4), the dependent variable is the market-adjusted first day 
IPO return and in specifications (5) and (6) the dependent variable is market-adjusted first week and first month IPO returns respectively. The sample includes 
IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE from January 2004 to December 2013. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 5  
Univariate Analysis: Post-IPO Institutional Holdings 
 
 
At allocation 
(1) 
1st quarter  
post-listing 
(2) 
2nd quarter 
post-listing 
(3) 
Difference 
(2-1) 
(4) 
p-value 
(5) 
Difference 
(3-2) 
(6) 
p-value 
(7) 
Panel A: Holdings for total IPOs        
Total institutional 15.14 (13.76) 11.46 (10.21) 11.60 (10.25) -3.68 (-3.55) 0.000 (0.000) 0.14 (0.04) 0.556 (0.385) 
Domestic 6.26 (4.95) 5.13 (3.34) 4.91 (3.07) -1.13 (-1.61) 0.009 (0.000) -0.22 (-0.27) 0.045 (0.007) 
Foreign 8.88 (7.33) 6.33 (4.93) 6.69 (4.73) -2.55 (-2.40) 0.000 (0.000) 0.36 (-0.20) 0.143 (0.008) 
Difference (Domestic – Foreign) -2.61 (-2.38) -1.20 (-1.59) -1.78 (-1.66)     
p-value 0.000(0.000) 0.015 (0.007) 0.000 (0.000)     
      
Panel B: Holdings by first day return quartiles      
Cold IPOs (n=82)        
Total institutional 13.64 (14.39) 9.63 (8.99) 9.44 (9.71) -4.01 (-5.50) 0.000 (0.000) -0.19 (0.82) 0.552 (0.243) 
Domestic 5.99 (4.10) 4.75 (3.32) 4.41 (3.01) -1.24 (-0.76) 0.000 (0.000) -0.34 (-0.33) 0.010 (0.003) 
Foreign 7.65 (8.01) 4.88 (2.85) 5.03 (2.25) -2.77 (-5.16) 0.000 (0.000) 0.15 (-0.60) 0.649 (0.613) 
Difference (Domestic – Foreign) -1.66 (-3.91) -0.13 (0.49) -0.62 (0.76)     
p-value 0.020 (0.013) 0.872 (0.420) 0.462 (0.321)     
        
Cool IPOs (n=82)        
Total institutional 15.48 (13.45) 11.13 (10.11) 11.40 (10.31) -4.35 (-3.34) 0.000 (0.000) 0.27 (0.20) 0.591 (0.749) 
Domestic 6.93 (5.21) 5.31 (3.52) 4.93 (3.21) -1.62 (-1.69) 0.000 (0.000) -0.21 (-0.00) 0.037 (0.008) 
Foreign 8.55 (7.09) 5.82 (4.86) 6.47 (5.47) -2.73 (-2.23) 0.000 (0.000) 0.65 (0.61) 0.158 (0.057) 
Difference (Domestic – Foreign) -1.62 (-1.88) -0.51 (-1.34) -1.54 (-2.26)     
p-value 0.115 (0.048) 0.549 (0.380) 0.089 (0.066)     
        
Warm IPOs (n=83)        
Total institutional 15.90 (13.71) 13.86 (12.95) 14.46 (12.73) -2.04 (-0.76) 0.044 (0.083) 0.60 (-0.22) 0.446 (0.025) 
Domestic 5.99 (5.48) 5.73 (4.33) 5.75 (4.38) -0.26 (-1.15) 0.554 (0.321) 0.02 (0.05) 0.895 (0.741) 
Foreign 9.91 (7.72) 8.13 (5.75) 8.71 (6.65) -1.78 (-1.97) 0.040 (0.061) 0.58 (0.90) 0.471 (0.025) 
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Difference (Domestic – Foreign) -3.92 (-2.24) -2.40 (-1.42) -2.96 (-2.27)     
p-value 0.002 (0.003) 0.031 (0.085) 0.008 (0.012)     
Hot IPOs (n=82)        
Total institutional 15.28 (13.78) 11.41 (10.11) 11.38 (8.65) -3.87 (-3.67) 0.000 (0.000) -0.03 (-1.46) 0.905 (0.626) 
Domestic 6.16 (4.40) 4.77 (1.56) 4.63 (1.62) -1.39 (-2.84) 0.003 (0.003) -0.14 (0.06) 0.630 (0.582) 
Foreign 9.12 (6.56) 6.64 (4.99) 6.75 (4.23) -2.48 (-1.57) 0.001 (0.000) 0.11 (-0.76) 0.781 (0.649) 
Difference (Domestic – Foreign) -2.96 (-2.16) -1.87 (-3.43) -2.12 (-2.61)     
p-value 0.022 (0.006) 0.127 (0.043) 0.092 (0.017)     
 
This table reports the univariate statistics of institutional holdings immediately after allocation (column 1), first quarter (column 2) and second quarter (column 3) 
after listing. The figures represent the percentage of holdings relative to total shares outstanding. Total institutional, domestic and foreign respectively refer to 
total institutional, domestic institutional and foreign institutional holdings. Column (4) shows the difference between first quarter holdings and the holdings 
immediately after allocation while column (6) shows the difference between second and first quarter holdings. Columns (5) and (7) show the p-values of the t-test 
(z-test) for the difference in mean (median) for change in institutional holdings between the two periods. The sample includes IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE 
from January 2004 to December 2013. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 
Multivariate Regression Analysis: Post IPO Institutional Holdings  
 At the End of the First Quarter  Change (First Quarter – Allocation) 
 Total 
(1) 
Domestic 
(2) 
Foreign 
(3) 
 Total 
(4) 
Domestic 
(5) 
Foreign 
(6) 
Log Market Capitalization 1.476*** 0.105 1.368***  0.280 -0.204 0.479 
 (2.76) (0.34) (3.37)  (0.57) (-0.56) (1.42) 
        
Book-to-Market -0.053 0.168 -0.223  -0.675 -0.529 -0.144 
 (-0.07) (0.35) (-0.38)  (-1.41) (-1.61) (-0.28) 
        
Log Age 1.700** 1.335*** 0.363*  2.392*** 0.771* 1.614*** 
 (2.13) (3.16) (1.86)  (3.43) (1.67) (3.17) 
        
ROA 3.776 1.487 2.296  -0.132 -4.401 4.255** 
 (1.26) (0.79) (0.99)  (-0.04) (-1.34) (2.03) 
        
Cash 8.379*** 9.905*** 1.530*  1.667 0.618 2.288*** 
 (4.76) (3.32) (1.87)  (1.56) (0.49) (3.14) 
        
Leverage -1.789 -0.548 -1.222  0.100 -0.019 0.137 
 (-0.62) (-0.31) (-0.57)  (0.05) (-0.01) (0.07) 
        
Investment Opportunities -0.020 0.025 -0.041  0.263 0.110 0.160 
 (-0.05) (0.12) (-0.18)  (1.22) (0.76) (0.71) 
        
Promoter’s Post-IPO Holdings  -13.516*** -5.517** -8.097***  2.935 2.443 0.413 
 (-3.91) (-2.28) (-2.93)  (0.90) (0.94) (0.15) 
        
Underwriter Reputation 3.918*** 1.757** 2.159*  2.092* 0.022 2.067** 
 (2.68) (2.11) (1.94)  (1.81) (0.03) (2.54) 
        
Stock Return  0.560 -0.244 0.802  2.921* 0.153 2.762** 
 (0.33) (-0.22) (0.66)  (1.94) (0.20) (2.26) 
        
Stock Volatility 43.909 -7.307 50.506  -105.730*** -37.016 -69.325*** 
 (1.06) (-0.31) (1.55)  (-2.90) (-1.24) (-2.99) 
        
Industry & Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -6.218 3.967 -10.092**  -10.744** -1.302 -9.315*** 
 (-0.93) (0.85) (-2.58)  (-2.53) (-0.39) (-3.26) 
Observations 329 329 329  329 329 329 
Adjusted R
2
 0.190 0.200 0.095  0.197 0.050 0.203 
 
Specifications (1) – (3) show the OLS regression results for institutional holdings in the first quarter after listing. Specifications (4) – (6) 
show the OLS regression results for the change in institutional holdings from the date of allocation to the end of the first quarter after 
listing. The sample includes IPOs listed on the BSE and NSE from January 2004 to December 2013. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Domestic and Foreign Institutional Investors’ Investment in IPOs 
 
Highlights 
 
 We compare domestic & foreign institutional investors’ investment in IPOs. 
 FIIs appear to be more aggressive in IPO subscription than DIIs. 
 FIIs reduce their IPO holdings more deeply than DIIs in post-listing period. 
 Evidence is consistent with the notion that FIIs chase hot markets with hot money. 
 
